alt Hacker NewsNo, but, the hashes are features of the content tracking system that hook it together. There is no reason that a signing scheme must rely on and trust those hashes!
We can round up the bits that make up a commit in a SHA-1-based repo, and sign those bits securely; this is a thing that is possible.
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Dylan16807 • today at 7:52 AM
> There is no reason that a signing scheme must rely on and trust those hashes!
Not "must", but it would be stupid to use two sets of hashes without a compelling reason.
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dwohnitmok • today at 5:14 AM
> We can round up the bits that make up a commit in a SHA-1-based repo, and sign those bits securely; this is a thing that is possible.
Yes but as my other comment explains, this is not particularly useful in and of itself.
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But is "commit" in this context a full snapshot or a delta? Because what you describe will only work for the former.
Regardless, commit hashes should be a security mechanism IMO. And not just commits. I should be able to treat _any_ content addressing system as having secure addresses. If you can engineer collisions you need to patch your system.
(Note that the above does not necessarily imply support for unconditionally forcing a fork of the entire git ecosystem.)