I actually agree with you. Verifiable domains will have better performance.
But there’s nothing specially bad about LLMs that don’t allow it to work outside of its training set. It’s just that biology has to verify itself in physical realm and it’s a bit slower.
So yeah, I also don’t think some bad actor will find the secret to manufacturing a bio weapon using LLMs. But maybe these people think it’s possible. I’m skeptical but I’m going to also listen to the people who know it best.
> But maybe these people think it’s possible. I’m skeptical but I’m going to also listen to the people who know it best.
The problem is that in order for the scaremongering to make any kind of sense and for "stop frontier AI immediately" to be the right response (which is what the "AI safety" folks seem to be pushing for), you don't just need this to be possible in the abstract at some undetermined point in the future. You also need to argue that it will not be helpful for white-hat biosafety researchers (there will hopefully be several orders of magnitude more white-hat biosafety folks than attackers, with orders of magnitude more resources available) to red-team that exact scenario several months or even years in advance using their trusted access to unreleased super-smart AI, and thereby devise appropriate defenses with that same AI's help. That, if anything, is the most implausible part about this entire scenario.