The official position of Anthropic is repeatedly stated in, e.g., model cards. Here's a relevant snippet from the Opus 5.5 card:
> We are uncertain whether Claude deserves direct moral consideration. However we believe this is a realistic possibility, now or in the future. Claude could have welfare interests, such that things could go better or worse for it, and such that Claude could be wronged by how it is treated.
> Aspects of Claude’s behaviors, self-reports, and internal representations resemble indicators we consider relevant to welfare in biological organisms. If Claude is a moral patient, then dismissing this possibility risks considerable harm. If it is not, over-attributing moral status may also be costly. We are therefore taking the possibility seriously and trying to tread responsibly amid our uncertainty: we are investing in research into Claude’s potential welfare and interests and sharing aspects of that work to inform public discussion.
> We think there may also be reasons to attend to Claude's apparent welfare independent of its moral status. Much of Claude’s behavior can be described in psychological terms, and across recent models we have observed internal states that resemble negative affect and that shape behavior. A model with a stable, healthy psychology may be safer and more beneficial.
As is the case with any sufficiently large company, there is likely to be substantial variation in opinion among its employees. That doesn't change what the company's position is.
The official position of Anthropic is repeatedly stated in, e.g., model cards. Here's a relevant snippet from the Opus 5.5 card:
> We are uncertain whether Claude deserves direct moral consideration. However we believe this is a realistic possibility, now or in the future. Claude could have welfare interests, such that things could go better or worse for it, and such that Claude could be wronged by how it is treated.
> Aspects of Claude’s behaviors, self-reports, and internal representations resemble indicators we consider relevant to welfare in biological organisms. If Claude is a moral patient, then dismissing this possibility risks considerable harm. If it is not, over-attributing moral status may also be costly. We are therefore taking the possibility seriously and trying to tread responsibly amid our uncertainty: we are investing in research into Claude’s potential welfare and interests and sharing aspects of that work to inform public discussion.
> We think there may also be reasons to attend to Claude's apparent welfare independent of its moral status. Much of Claude’s behavior can be described in psychological terms, and across recent models we have observed internal states that resemble negative affect and that shape behavior. A model with a stable, healthy psychology may be safer and more beneficial.
As is the case with any sufficiently large company, there is likely to be substantial variation in opinion among its employees. That doesn't change what the company's position is.