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akerl_ • today at 3:00 PM • 2 replies • view on HN

You said "yes" but then answered "no"?

Like it seems your disagreement is that you're pointing out there are systems today that trust WebPKI CAs but don't validate CT/SCTs. I'd agree that that's an issue and I want those systems to join the world where CT exists.

As I said, in a world with CAA records and CT logs, this isn't an issue. If your CA wants to be in root trust stores, you have to put your certs in CT logs. CAA records are "advisory" in the sense that we mandate that root-trusted CAs obey CAA records and that they write cert issuance to CT logs, so a trusted CA that violates CAA records has to tell on itself in a very detectable way.


Replies

Scott_Helme_ • today at 3:10 PM

I'm just not sure that I can see a world where all devices that rely on TLS/PKI are capable of CT SCT validation. Look at the issues we have around stale root stores still happening when we have validity periods of literally decades. Some of these clients out there simply won't ever be able to keep their trusted log store updated.

Refs: Part 1: https://scotthelme.co.uk/impending-doom-root-ca-expiring-leg... Part 2: https://scotthelme.co.uk/complexities-chain-building-ca-infr... Part 3: https://scotthelme.co.uk/cross-signing-alternate-trust-paths... Part 4: https://scotthelme.co.uk/building-certificate-chains/

There's also the Let's Encrypt root migration that was postponed due to legacy devices: https://scotthelme.co.uk/lets-encrypt-postpone-isrg-root-tra...

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lelandbatey • today at 3:52 PM

You said:

> In a world [where] CT logs and CAA records [exist]

And we are in that world. CT logs and CAA records exist. They are around. What you are implying you said is:

> In a world with CT logs and CAA records [and everyone/everything reads and validates them]

We are not in that world, and we probably won't enter that world for the next 15 to 20 years because we are also in a world where folks expect networked devices to be able to communicate (mostly) securely without constantly communicating with a centralized set of clearinghouses arbitrating "what is secure".

As we are discovering, our flawed systems may need broader rethinking, especially if we want secure communication (with all the epistemological ball of yarn that comes with it) without constant total centralization, which seems to be the approach-of-least-resistance lately.