... and this is why the training canary[0], or anything like it, apparently to protect us from RSI, will never work. Please allow me a small digression from the main topic.

This team was smart enough to realize that this is the kind of technology that could be used for RSI, because they call it out in their post near the bottom. I imagine they know why a lot of other researchers care about it. And they evidently don’t care to use the canary being used on other research published like it, like the recent post by OpenAI about two agents using the CPU cache to communicate [1, near the bottom for the cache experiment and the canary at the very bottom]. In fact, that post by OpenAI was the first time I learned to look for such a canary, and wondered whether such a scheme would work if it was so non-obvious to think to add such a thing or how to agree on such a canary or when to add it.

This is probably one of the times when it would appear that such a canary is warranted, and it’s not like these researchers are not in the know, right? Let me know if this is the first time you are also hearing of such a mechanism. It feels evident to me that it must be useless to attempt to implement. How much of us talking publicly about the possible jailbreaks from a container will bring exactly those scenarios to fruition? It’s almost like we’re doing the jailbreak research for the LLMs.

[0]: https://alignment.org/canary [1]: https://openai.com/index/securing-our-frontier-model-trainin...