The point of running a local unbound is indeed to turn on DNSsec validation. After that, it's the domains' fault for not using DNSsec. But at least your own stuff won't be tampered with, because you use DNSsec on your own domains, right? Right?
:-(
Coincidentally, a bunch of free wifi stuff blocks the root key queries unbound does at startup, resulting in nothing working until you get those records in there somehow (e.g. load_cache).
DNSSEC adoption rate means that this would be insufficient to detect (let alone prevent) that type of tampering for most domains. The correct solution is identified the the first paragraph of the post, which is to use a tamper resistant transport to the dns server (eg DoT, or DoH if you like everything being wrapped in http)
I was under the impression that dnssec's entire value was rather controversial? I'm not a crypographer so I had to skim https://sockpuppet.org/blog/2015/01/15/against-dnssec/ and I still don't understand it, but if
> In fact, it does nothing for any of the “last mile” of DNS lookups: the link between software and DNS servers. It’s a server-to-server protocol.
is true, then I'm ... pretty unsold on its usefulness. Anyone wanna ELI5 whether that's untrue or anything's changed in the last decade?