This vulnerability was discovered by Johan Carlsson and we were informed by GitLab on 2026-11-12.
Initially we set 2026-11-25 for a coordinated disclosure;
due to the new Ruby2Shell bug GitLab had to update earlier
and thus we also disclosed the GPGME bug on 2026-11-20.
I guess pretty important for GitLab since it supports signed commits, code execution in that path is pretty bad.You can find the GitLab Omnibus related patch here: https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/omnibus-gitlab/-/commit/279ac3...
It's a double free bug, not an RCE chain. Are these vulnerability reports intentionally overstated?
What are practical attack vectors for Linux workstations and servers?
The masses of internet users don't know what GPG is. I'd caim the majority of software developers don't have a GPG key and never explicitly verify any signature.
But packages of many distros are verified using GPG. Is the vulnerable component involved or not?
The vulnerability is in GpgME (the library), not GnuTLS (the library).
Editorialized submission title to be better bait.
The correct title is: GnuPG Security Advisory for GPGME
so essentially look at the key before? (and hope your program does not have another RCE...)
Luckily nobody uses it!
This is a reminder that Seqouia-PGP exists, and its 'sq' CLI is way more intuitive.
more or less than 0 impacted systems?
Reportedly fixed by Red Hat 5 years ago based on the output from conventional tools, but missed by upstream: https://gitlab.com/redhat/centos-stream/rpms/gpgme/-/blob/c9...