In my experience, it comes down to project management and organizational structure problems.

Companies hire a "security team" and put them behind the security@ email, then decide they'll figure out how to handle issues later.

When an issue comes in, the security team tries to forward the security issue to the team that owns the project so it can be fixed. This is where complicated org charts and difficult incentive structures can get in the way.

Determining which team actually owns the code containing the bug can be very hard, depending on the company. Many security team people I've worked with were smart, but not software developers by trade. So they start trying to navigate the org chart to figure out who can even fix the issue. This can take weeks of dead-ends and "I'm busy until Tuesday next week at 3:30PM, let's schedule a meeting then" delays.

Even when you find the right team, it can be difficult to get them to schedule the fix. In companies where roadmaps are planned 3 quarters in advance, everyone is focused on their KPIs and other acronyms, and bonuses are paid out according to your ticket velocity and on-time delivery stats (despite PMs telling you they're not), getting a team to pick up the bug and work on it is hard. Again, it can become a wall of "Our next 3 sprints are already full with urgent work from VP so-and-so, but we'll see if we can fit it in after that"

Then legal wants to be involved, too. So before you even respond to reports you have to flag the corporate counsel, who is already busy and doesn't want to hear it right now.

So half or more of the job of the security team becomes navigating corporate bureaucracy and slicing through all of the incentive structures to inject this urgent priority somewhere.

Smart companies recognize this problem and will empower security teams to prioritize urgent things. This can cause another problem where less-than-great security teams start wielding their power to force everyone to work on not-urgent issues that get spammed to the security@ email all day long demanding bug bounties, which burns everyone out. Good security teams will use good judgment, though.

A lot of the time it’s less “nobody checked the security inbox” and more “the one person who understands that part of the system is juggling twelve other fires.” Security fixes are often a one-hour patch wrapped in two weeks of internal routing, approvals, and “who even owns this code?” archaeology. Holiday schedules and spam filters don’t help, but organizational entropy is usually the real culprit.

security@ emails do get a lot of spam. It doesn't get talked about very much unless you're monitoring one yourself, but there's a fairly constant stream of people begging for bug bounty money for things like the Secure flag not being set on a cookie.

That said, in my experience this spam is still a few emails a day at the most, I don't think there's any excuse for not immediately patching something like that. I guess maybe someone's on holiday like you said.

Well we have 600 people in the global response center I work at. And the priority issue count is currently 26000. That means its serious enough that its been assigned to some one. There are tens of thousands of unassigned issues cuz the traige teams are swamped. People dont realize as systems get more complex issues increase. They never decrease. And the chimp troupes response has always been a Story - we can handle it.

Another aspect to consider: when you reduce the amount of permission anything has (like here the returned token), you risk breaking something.

In a complex system it can be very hard to understand what will break, if anything. In a less complex system, it can still be hard to understand if the person who knows the security model very well isn't available.

Not every organization prioritizes being able to ship a code change at the drop of a hat. This often requires organizational dedication to heavy automated testing a CI, which small companies often aren't set up to do.

> October 27, 2025 disclosure and November 4, 2025 email confirmation seems like a long time to have their entire client file system exposed

There is always the simple answer, these are lawyers so they are probably scrambling internally to write a response that covers themselves legaly also trying to figure out how fucked they are.

1 week is surprisingly not that slow.

> October 27, 2025 disclosure and November 4, 2025 email confirmation seems like a long time to have their entire client file system exposed

I have unfortunately seen way worse. If it will take more than an hour and the wrong people are in charge of the money, you can go a pretty long time with glaring vulnerabilities.

I'm a bit conflicted about what responsible disclosure should be, but in many cases it seems like these conditions hold:

1) the hack is straightforward to do;

2) it can do a lot of damage (get PII or other confidential info in most cases);

3) downtime of the service wouldn't hurt anyone, especially if we compare it to the risk of the damage.

But, instead of insisting on the immediate shutting down of the affected service, we give companies weeks or months to fix the issue while notifying no one in the process and continuing with business as usual.

I've submitted 3 very easy exploits to 3 different companies the past year and, thankfully, they fixed them in about a week every time. Yet, the exploits were trivial (as I'm not good enough to find the hard ones, I admit). Mostly IDORs, like changing id=123456 to id=1 all the way up to id=123455 and seeing a lot medical data that doesn't belong to me. All 3 cases were medical labs because I had to have some tests done and wanted to see how secure my data was.

Sadly, in all 3 cases I had to send a follow-up e-mail after ~1 week, saying that I'll make the exploit public if they don't fix it ASAP. What happened was, again, in all 3 cases, the exploit was fixed within 1-2 days.

If I'd given them a month, I feel they would've fixed the issue after a month. If I'd given then a year - after a year.

And it's not like there aren't 10 different labs in my city. It's not like online access to results is critical, either. You can get a printed result or call them to write them down. Yes, it would be tedious, but more secure.

So I should've said from the beginning something like:

> I found this trivial exploit that gives me access to medical data of thousands of people. If you don't want it public, shut down your online service until you fix it, because it's highly likely someone else figured it out before me. If you don't, I'll make it public and ruin your reputation.

Now, would I make it public if they don't fix it within a few days? Probably not, but I'm not sure. But shutting down their service until the fix is in seems important. If it was some hard-to-do hack chaining several exploits, including a 0-day, it would be likely that I'd be the first one to find it and it wouldn't be found for a while by someone else afterwards. But ID enumerations? Come on.

So does the standard "responsible disclosure", at least in the scenario I've given (easy to do; not critical if the service is shut down), help the affected parties (the customers) or the businesses? Why should I care about a company worth $X losing $Y if it's their fault?

I think in the future I'll anonymously contact companies with way more strict deadlines if their customers (or others) are in serious risk. I'll lose the ability to brag with my real name, but I can live with it.

As to the other comments talking about how spammed their security@ mail is - that's the cost of doing business. It doesn't seem like a valid excuse to me. Security isn't one of hundreds random things a business should care about. It's one of the most important ones. So just assign more people to review your mail. If you can't, why are you handling people's PII?