alt Hacker NewsThis article does not mention that environment variables are also visible by process in /proc/*/environ (which has restrictive permissions, but is completely visible to root).
PuTTY has added a -pwfile option for use in ssh. If not exported, this interface is likely the best for non-key batch use. It seems much superior to sshpass.
The old .netrc format can be adapted for storage (which appears popular for curl), but I prefer sqlite databases, with permissions removed for all but the owner.
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> This article does not mention that environment variables are also visible by process in /proc/*/environ (which has restrictive permissions, but is completely visible to root).
What isn't visible to root? Maybe if you're willing to go down a really deep rabbit hole you can play that game, but I would generally explicitly exclude root from my threat model.
> This article does not mention that environment variables are also visible by process in /proc/*/environ (which has restrictive permissions, but is completely visible to root).
He's explicitly not using export, so they won't show up there. Plain variables are not in the environment.
(it's good to bring up this file as well as getting inherited by child processes though)
As pointed out by evgpbfhnr, I do avoid using environment variables and justify it (though with different reasoning than yours).
Your justification is the kind of thing I mention as out-of-scope (for my purposes!) in my conclusion:
> There are also many bases that I don’t cover and routes through which sufficiently-smart malware could easily still obtain the secrets I’m working with.
/proc/$pid/environ, /proc/$pid/mem and other such vectors (ptrace, bpftrace, equivalents on other platforms) are real, but:
- they're not vectors of _accidental_ leakage like dumping the full process environment to logs or shell history are
- they rely on privileged access existing at the time that I'm handling the secret, while logs or shell history can be obtained _in the future_
- they're not the kind of thing I expect broad-spectrum malware to go rooting for: the memory of all processes is a lot of data to classify/exfiltrate, and if I were a malware author I'd fear that that would be far too resource-intensive and thus conspicuous. Browser cookie storage, password manager databases, keylogging, and the like are much easier and more valuable pickings.