What is "Google Messages"? I can't count the number of articles people have written over time about how many first-party messaging apps Google themselves have put out (and then put down), not to mention what messaging apps get shoveled on by third-party android integrators.

> the main reason a message wouldn't be properly end-to-end encrypted in Google's Messages app is when communicating with an iPhone user, because Apple has dragged their feet on implementing RCS features in iMessage

(or with any other android user who isn't using a first-party device / isn't using this one app)

> [...] Android's equivalent cloud backup service has been properly end-to-end encrypted by default for many years. Meaning that you don't need to convince the whole world to turn on an optional feature before your backups can be fully protected.

You make it out to seem that it's impossible for Google to read your cloud backups, but the article you link to [0] earlier in your post says that "this passcode-protected key material is encrypted to a Titan security chip on our datacenter floor" (emphasis added). So they have your encrypted cloud backup, and the only way to get the key material to decrypt it is to get it from an HSM in their datacenter, every part of which and the access to which they control... sounds like it's not really any better than Apple, from what I'm reading here. Granted, that article is from 2018 and I certainly have not been keeping up on android things.

[0] https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/google-and-android-h...

You can enable Advanced Data Protection to address that issue with iMessages.

Giving users an option between both paths is usually best. Most users care a lot more that they can’t restore a usable backup of their messages than they do that their messages are unreadable by the company storing them.

I used to work at a company where our products were built around encryption. Users here on HN are not the norm. You can’t trust that most users will save recovery codes, encryption seed phrases, etc in a manner that will be both available and usable when they need them, and then they tend to care a lot less about the privacy properties that provides and a lot more that they no longer have their messages with {deceased spouse, best friend, business partner, etc}.

This is your blog post, so I'll ask you a question. What are you trying to state in Belief #1? The message is unclear to me with how it's worded:

  > In this table, in the "iCloud Backup (including device and Messages backup)" row, under "Standard data protection", 
  > the "Encryption" column reads "In transit & on server". Yes, this means that Apple can read all of your messages 
  > out of your iCloud backups.

This shadow device would have it's own keys to read messages sent to your iCloud account. To my knowledge, there's nothing in the security model to prevent this.