Some other interviews/blurbs from the authors (from their Universities):
https://politicalscience.ku.dk/about/news/2026/banal-but-bru...
https://www.hertie-school.org/en/news/detail/content/why-ord...
Two points that the NYT article does not emphasize as much:
* Career pressures can go both ways - "the same career pressure that drives some officers to do the regime’s dirty work drives others to join coups against it. Both are all-in gambles by people with their backs against the wall – one bets on the current regime, the other bets on its replacement."
* Meritocracy and professionalism in itself is not protective - "The Argentine army maintained a remarkably meritocratic promotion system for over a century – through democracies, personalist dictatorships, and military juntas alike" and "The policy implication is sobering: professionalisation alone won’t protect democracy. We need to think carefully about what happens to those who lose in competitive systems and what pathways we offer them."
In other words, there is a structural challenge - how do we treat "losers" in a system that is constantly present, and then there is the authoritarian's take on that challenge. Realistically, this is just highlighting a mechanism, and once someone is actually in a position to take advantage of such a mechanism, there's typically not much you can do to engineer an institutional safeguard within that system.
What you and the article captured is that the argument that the civil service and military is not a "4th branch of government".
An effective, professional workforce is important, but ultimately professionalism and process can only enhance or blunt power.
> "We need to think carefully about what happens to those who lose in competitive systems and what pathways we offer them"
To badly paraphrase some guest on a half-remembered economics podcast on debt forgiveness:
To really understand a system, you have to study its waste pipelines. What is discarded and why? What do those discarded things ultimately become?