alt Hacker News> Why not tell us more about the requirements for hardware certification?
Err, it's actually pretty simple: the token/certificate representing your ID (or credit card, or anything really) cannot be exfiltrated by userspace or installed kernel space apps or intercepted on the way to TPM when issued. And it cannot be duplicated.
It's the same set of requirements that are put on credit card smart chips and biometric chips in EU IDs and Passports (which are essentially also TPMs).
But sure, it's a all an evil conspiracy against general purpose computing. And they're all out to get ya. Now smash that downvote for a vote against the evil establishment.
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> cannot be exfiltrated by userspace or installed kernel space apps or intercepted on the way to TPM
So it must be secure against the user, as expected.
Preventing the user from "tampering" with the token means carving out a section of the machine and putting it out of his reach. You just created a government embassy on the user's machine. There's no telling what it will be abused for, and there's no escape.
> But sure, it's a all an evil conspiracy against general purpose computing.
You just advocated for putting an inescapable persisent cryptographic government ID on everybody's computers. This is the literal implementation of the surveillance state. Everything you do online, this token gets sent. It's the end of anonymity. Not even Tor gets around this.
>Err, it's actually pretty simple: the token/certificate representing your ID (or credit card, or anything really) cannot be exfiltrated by userspace or installed kernel space apps or intercepted on the way to TPM when issued. And it cannot be duplicated.
So you need a proprietary browser running on a proprietary OS (both userspace and the kernel) with proprietary TPM hardware. You just proved the point. No more Linux.