alt Hacker NewsI'm interested in this intersection of technical problems where we already have the tech to solve it, but the bottlenecks are social/legal/financial incentive.
Recently there was an old lady in the family that had an appendicitis, an ambulance rejected her, and the next day it got worse, and at that point she was accepted, but it was a bit too late.
One hypothesis is that triaging is hard and there's a lot of demand so things only go in when it's bad enough (considering there was medical insurance, they aren't charging per patient, so there's no incentive to take on more patients). But if that were the case, then preventive measures would actually reduce the total burden on their system.
The more cynical hypothesis that I'm holidng is that that health system is maximizing for work, if there's 10 appendicitis per month, and they are all handled in time, that's maybe like 5 hours of billable hours per patient? But if the appendicitis becomes bad enough and there's a puncture, then you have infections, complications, the patients have to stay for weeks and often come back for checkups, we are looking at maybe 100 billable hours? So the financial incentive is there.
In that sense what I want to add is that the title would be completely wrong, the solution is not for the hospital to pay 100$ for prevention, but for prevention to be more accurately priced, we should be paying 50k, and maybe even 100k for prevention, because we value it more than emergency action.
In a broader economic sense, there's a lot of cases where there's a huge difference between the cost and the value, Shkreli got a lot of heat for surging up medicine prices, but I don't think it's immediately obvious that something should be valued in proportion to what it costs. Maybe if we price heart prevention at 100K, there would be more incentive for everyone involved to just get a fucking pill to those in need, imagine how many people would jump at that opportunity to make it happen, call centers, bureocrats, NOC support, legal teams, all dedicated to making sure a pill gets to the patient before a heart attack does.
Nobody likes to say this out loud, but because the US healthcare system is largely based on “fee for service” billing, it is true by definition that the sicker the patients are, the more profit the providers make. So incentives for actually making people healthier have to be imposed in indirect ways.
There are some pockets of “per capita” payment, where the provider gets a fixed amount per person and is thus encouraged to reduce treatment costs, which indirectly should encourage preventative care, but also encourages just refusing to treat people.
We could remove these weird constraints by making health care a government service rather than a highly contorted pseudo-market, but that would not be the American way. It has to at least look like a market, even if it’s an ineffective, inefficient, opaque, corrupt one.