Apple has significantly weakened its security assurances in a way that is arguably deceptive. They used to say nobody can access your data, not even Apple. Now they say Apple cannot access your data. People will point out that your key is created on your device, lives on your device, and never leaves your device, but that is just your key. Your key is likely a KEK (key encryption key) that opens another key (not “your” key, let’s call it the actual key) that your data is secured with. There can be other parties (UK government) with their own KEK that opens a copy of the actual key. In this scenario, Apple can have no access to a KEK that opens the actual key, but they are forced to make the wording change they did, if they want to stay honest.
I say the statement is arguably deceptive because it presents the same feel of assurance that the old one did, to most people.
Note John Ternus in a recent event (WWDC keynote if I recall correctly) used the old wording. I think this was a slip-up (I’d hate to think it was a calculated lie posing as a slip-up).
This is just not true. Apple's current platform security white paper clearly states what you're complaining they took away:
"many Apple services use end-to-end encryption, which means the user’s iCloud data can be accessed only by the users themselves, and only from the trusted devices where they are signed in with their Apple Account."
And: " If a user chooses to turn on Advanced Data Protection, their trusted devices retain sole access to the encryption keys"
Also, there's no need to make suppositions such as this: > Your key is likely a KEK (key encryption key) that opens another key (not “your” key, let’s call it the actual key) that your data is secured with.
The details of keys are clearly outlined in the same white paper: "Most iCloud data is first encrypted on the user’s device, using device-generated iCloud keys, before being uploaded to iCloud servers."
So no - there's no layer of keys that Apple or the UK or whatever can use to bypass e2e where it's enabled.
This isn't related to the article, and it's not true? iCloud ADP still exists in its original form, there was no modification allowing 3rd parties access to ADP decryption keys.
They claim E2EE for certain services. "Your key is likely a KEK" - What makes you think this? That would straight up not be E2EE.
They're also clear that much of iCloud isn't E2EE unless you have "Advanced Data Protection": https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651
The on-device private key material has to be a KEK anyway, otherwise it wouldn't be usable on all your iCloud-linked devices.
I still trust Apple in the USA at least. When I enrolled in advanced data protection, it did say nobody not even Apple, not just not Apple. It may be that they need to tighten their contractual language everywhere to deliver a uniformly semantic sentence.
Where exactly do they say this, where is this wording change?
https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651#advanced
"This specifies no one, not even apple." I.e they don't store the keys you use for e2e encryption. They've systematically been against introducing backdoors here. Now, is it possible they have and they've been lying through their teeth? Surre, but its unlikely they would be so brazen.
Didn't they also deceptively say that those things that Apple cannot access only apply to local content, but if you have an iCloud backup (which pretty much anyone has), then Apple has access to that.
> People will point out that your key is created on your device, lives on your device, and never leaves your device, but that is just your key. Your key is likely a KEK (key encryption key) that opens another key (not “your” key, let’s call it the actual key) that your data is secured with.
The near exact same deception has been put in place by Google/Microsoft/Apple with passkeys. It used to be, before passkeys, that people really could have a secret hidden behind an actual HSM, impossible to copy.
But they teamed to come up with passkeys that can now... Be copied from device to device. A secret, safe behind a HSM, replaced by something that can be copied.
What a win for security.
And all the idiots are cheering: "buuut buuuuuut buuuuuut it is CONVENIENT".
Yeah.
Well, if Apple provided the KEK to the UK government then Apple is capable of generating another KEK for its own use. That means Apple can in fact access customer data on its own, just after a couple extra steps.
(Yes it is theoretically possible to create a complex encryption scheme whereby the UK government posses the only copy of a key that is in turn needed to generated a duplicate KEK, but I find it hard to believe Apple and the UK government have organized such a dance without a simple backup for the day the magic UK key gets lost/corrupted.)
it appears apple has done this in response to government interference which they cannot even legally disclose. what would you have apple do here?
No, the whole reason Apple withdrew it from Great Britain is that it refused to weaken its security in response to the Home Office's TCN. The whole issue these articles are discussing is Apple's refusal to do exactly what you're saying. Apple clearly states otherwise (and would suffer colossal brand damage were it to lie, even amongst laymen). You are engaging in pure conjecture, and not even a very good conjecture at that, without a basis in fact. Ternus probably used the old wording because the old wording is still true. It's possible that Apple's legal team was the driving force behind the choice of wording.
Also people dig into iOS pretty regularly and it seems very, very unlikely zero security researchers would have noticed that it's a KEK. When you use an ordinary DEK you have to run decrypt(data, key). When you have a KEK you do decrypt(data, decrypt(wrapped key, kek)). Those aren't the same code.