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o_-_o • today at 11:18 AM • 4 replies • view on HN

The fact that these systems are not air-gapped[1] is very troubling.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_gap_(networking)


Replies

EvanAnderson • today at 3:14 PM

As Stuxnet showed us, and Ed Skoudis (of SANS fame) said during his keynote at DerbyCon 3:

"At best, an air gap is a high-latency connection."

The usability of a truly air-gapped system rapidly approaches zero, so inevitably air-gapped systems end up growing contrivances and compromises that make them not air-gapped anymore.

"The network is the computer" might seem like trite marketing speak but seeing how the utility of computers has taken off as ubiquitous networking has become available speaks to the statement's truth. The amount of utility the FBI could get out of an air-gapped system would be dramatically less.

Floppy diskette-based computer viruses in the 1980s were enough proof alone that air-gapping isn't a panacea.

bigfatkitten • today at 12:58 PM

How would you propose that the 64,000+[0] local, state and federal law enforcement and other related agencies that NCIC is intended to serve access that system?

[0] https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk3/1982/8203/820307.PDF

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wcoenen • today at 11:29 AM

Let's say you put the air-gapped database somewhere in the middle of the US. How would agents working on the east or west coast (>2000km away) interact with the database?

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throw0101d • today at 12:49 PM

> The fact that these systems are not air-gapped[1] is very troubling.

Not necessarily wrong, but a reminder that an air gap did not stop Stuxnet:

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuxnet

Also, the CIA triad is part of most security thinking:

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CIA_triad

with the "A" standing for availability: if regular/authorized users can't access and process the information (somewhat conveniently), how much value does the service actually have?