In the article he talks about living within a few minutes walk to work and telling too many people so they made him the emergency office guy. Same thing happened to me, foolishly told everyone hey I can see my apartment from here so I would get panicked calls to run in and shut down servers because the information security guy got a tip of an impending exploit about to be released on a holiday weekend with no way to do it remotely. Everyone else lived a ferry ride or commuter train away.
Odd that they didn't have at minimum 1) a physical Emergency Power Off (EPO) button inside the datacenter, such that one button could de-energize everything -- usually required as part of building a datacenter due to code variance for the "low voltage" (<4000V in this context...) wiring. 2) EPO interlink to the smoke alarms, such that it would de-energize equipment automatically (maybe with delay) if smoke detected.
Interesting. The Sequence of Operations we write for the data halls I work on specifically do not shut down the CRACs on smoke alarm for this reason. The International Mechanical Code (IMC) specifically allows this where a air handler over 2000 cfm serves only one space because it's recognized that it will not spread smoke around a building. 2000 cfm is the threshold where you typically have to install smoke detectors, and typically they do shut down on smoke detection.
The CRAC won't feed a fire oxygen as it's just recirculating the same oxygen depleted air.
The episode of their podcast where Ron explores the facilities side of their data centers and offices is worth a listen too
https://signalsandthreads.com/the-thermodynamics-of-trading/
Are there internet connected fire alarms that can be hacked to destroy the contents of some data centers? Like the European freezers?
I did not know that data centers with sprinklers exist. I guess this is a very stupid idea in the first place.
If there is a fire the decision is: all equipment might be lost in a fire OR all equipment will be lost by water damage.
I wonder why the answer was to turn off the servers instead of turn their cooling back on. Would it not be able to stabilize the temperature fast enough?
> every minute, ask every server in each location directly for the temperature from its onboard sensors, take the average, and if it’s elevated, blast an alert out to everyone on the systems team to check for datacenter overheat.
I've once done the opposite: the office "server room" (a small room with three racks, two of them for the patch panels, one for the servers and switches) was cooled by a mini-split which was prone to locking up with the compressor enabled (the relay which controls the compressor got stuck) and freezing, which then stopped the air from circulating due to all the ice. I wrote a script which ran on one of the servers which read the ambient temperature through IPMI to detect when the room was too cold, email a warning, and power off (using ssh) the neighboring servers and then itself.
TIL: wabi-sabi. I’ve been trying to find a way to express the beauty of imperfection in the age of AI, and this fits perfectly.
Great post. I hope a big paycheck was given to the author for saving the DC and the company from disaster.
Many many years ago someone told me that your data is not safe if is not at least in 3 very different physical places. Today, I would probably add the requirement to be on different providers as well.
I specifically remember a TV commercial many years ago (15-20 maybe) that was trying to show the sophistication of the company with an anecdote of how when looking at some other company as a potential investment, considered if they used sprinklers in their data centers and determined that they did not. I could have sworn the company advertising was Jane Street.
I thought these data centers have a way to pump in a gas that prevents fires? Remember touring a data center at some point that has this ability.
> the smoke alarm is wired to shut down the CRAC units
Why not just turn the CRAC back on?
> you don’t trust the automation unless there’s a big red-painted, mechanically connected lever you can pull to turn it off
Seems like this is one of those cases where you want to override the automation.
This would be the one time I get to hit the EPO button (which this DC seemed shockingly too ghetto to have) for our breakers and it not being a resume-generating event.
Related :) - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50434310
Ah the apocryphal VAX story/scenario is alive and well
I’m surprised by the pulling cords by hand part. Did they really not have an emergency power off wired up to a shunt trip or some other device to efficiently cut the power? Isn’t this mandatory, even? Especially in a datacenter in an office building?
Almost too close to 'Pool on the roof must have a leak' to be real ;)
How is it the only datacenter?
33 Thomas St is basically one huge datacenter, that's why it doesn't have any windows. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/33_Thomas_Street
I am shocked to hear they do not use foam.
He earned his bonus that year.
Man, I wish MOC were still alive. I’d love to know his take on this story.
Wow crazy I didn't know they had such simple systems
Surprised they even had sprinklers set up. Historically, things that avoid moisture like Halon Gas [1] have been used.
Alarm firmware wasn't programmed in OCaml
> a false smoke alarm, a datacenter with no cooling, and a sprint to pull every power cord before the sprinklers went off
I smell AI
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The article reminds me of when Hurricane Sandy took out a bunch of New York DCs with 3+ feet of water and people were carrying diesel up stairs to keep generators running.
“The superhuman folks at the data center are hauling 55 gallon drums of diesel fuel up 17 flights of stairs. Assuming they're able to sustain a rate of transfer that exceeds the rate of consumption, the data center should run until electricity is restored. The latest estimate from Con Edison for lower Manhattan is 4 days. (The New York Stock Exchange will be open tomorrow, also running on generator power.)”
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=4720388 (https://web.archive.org/web/20121101194314/http://status.fog...)
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/11/how-o...